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L. Upton Hatch and Wesley N. Musser
Insured  farm  loans  have  evolved  to  be  an  public  program  is  creating  indirect  costs  to
important component of the federal role in the  regular agricultural borrowers.
agricultural  credit  subsector.  Currently,  agri-  The Georgia Development Authority  (GDA)
cultural credit is supplied by three sets of insti-  provides  a  unique  opportunity  to  explore
tutions:  (1) private  firms and individuals,  (2)  empirically the policy issues related to publicly
the quasiprivate cooperative  Farm Credit Sys-  insured  farm  loan  programs.  The  GDA  was
tem, and (3) the federal public programs of the  created by the State of  Georgia  in  1954 as  a
Farmers  Home  Administration  (FmHA)  and  public nonprofit corporation. Its original capit-
Small  Business  Administration.  Statuatory  alization  was  provided  by  the  assets  of  the
authority currently limits federal programs to  Georgia Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. The
a  residual  role  of  lending  to  borrowers  who  function of the  GDA  is to insure  and  service
cannot receive credit from the other segments.  long-term loans secured by farm real estate for
Though a large component  of public programs  commercial  banks  and  other  credit  institu-
consists  of  emergency  loans  in  areas  of  tions. Total insured loans are limited to 15 per-
economic disaster, the FmHA also makes farm  cent  of  the  GDA's  capitalized  assets,  and
operating and real estate loans to farmers who  public appropriations or money market instru-
meet the statuatory requirements.  The  source  ments cannot be  a source of operating or loan
of funds  for some  FmHA  loans  is federal  ap-  funds.  Unlike the Farmers  Home Administra-
propriations  and  money  market  certificates.  tion, the GDA makes its program available to
However,  guaranteed  loans  have  become  an  all  owners  of farm real  estate. 2 The  GDA  en-
important  component  of  FmHA  programs.  ables us to analyze the impact of insured loans
These loans are made in cooperation with other  on the aggregate supply of farm credit without
agricultural  finance  agencies.  The  public  considering  the  limited  eligibility  for  loans
agency insures or guarantees repayment of the  associated with federal programs.
loan. The cooperating firm negotiates  the loan  The purpose of our article is to present some
and  provides  the  funds.  Usually  the interest  empirical  research  on  the  impact  of  insured
payment is below the current market interest  credit  on the aggregate  supply of agricultural
rate structure.'  credit.  Specifically, the alternative hypotheses
An  important  issue  concerning  the  guaran-  concerning  redistribution  of or increase  in the
teed loan program is whether  it effectively  in-  supply  of  agricultural  credit  by  agricultural
creases  the  aggregate  supply  of  agricultural  banks  are  tested  with reference  to  the GDA
credit  or  only  redistributes  loanable  funds  program.  A cross-sectional  econometric model
from regular farm borrowers to marginal farm  of agricultural credit supply by banks in Geor-
borrowers.  Redistribution  of  loanable  funds  gia  is  developed  and  estimated.  This  model
can be justified by public objectives related to  provides evidence on the policy  hypotheses as
income redistribution and facilitation  of entry  well as other hypotheses  pertaining to agricul-
into  farming.  Our investigation  does  not pur-  tural credit.
sue the desirability of these objectives;  instead
it focuses  on the extent to which the insured  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
loan program increases  agricultural credit.  In-
creasing  the  aggregate  supply  would  Recently,  Robison and Barry conceptualized
contribute  to these  objectives  without  trans-  the portfolio decision of a bank in an expected
ferring capital away from farmers who can  ob-  utility framework. Their model was an applica-
tain loans from other sources. Research on this  tion of  modern  portfolio theory  that explains
issue  would  help  to  determine  whether  the  the asset composition of portfolios on the basis
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25of the expected  value and variance  of returns  proposition  of  Adam  Smith  (p.  3).  The
(Markowitz; Sharpe). In this model, the bank is  existence  of economies  of size  in banking has
assumed  to maximize  the  following  formula-  been well documented empirically;  Mullineaux
tion of expected utility (EU).  discusses the issue and also reviews the perti-
nent literature.  Thus,  specialized  information
(1)  EU =  CjXj - a  E Xjxk o2 [  can serve as the basis for the assumption that
2)  J k  GDA  insured  loans  have  lower  risk  than
where xj = investment in asset j,  cj = expected  similar uninsured loans by banks.3
return on assets,  a = the risk aversion  coeffic-  In examining the substitution of GDA loans
ient for the bank,  and  oj2  = variance  of return  for  assets with  similar risks,  such as govern-
on asset j  if j  = k and covariance  between  re-  ment securities,  one must consider the indirect
turns on assets j and k is j # k. This framework  effects of such action in addition to direct risk
is consistent with both hypotheses  concerning  and returns of the two classes of assets. Recip-
the impact of  insured  loans  on the  supply  of  ients of the GDA loans are more likely to retain
agricultural  credit.  A  simple  rationalization  the  proceeds  in  the local  area.  As  Barry  has
would be that a bank would  substitute  GDA  noted,  such deposits can serve as the basis for
loans for other assets if the expected value and  increased  bank  investments.  GDA  loans  can
variance of returns on GDA loans were consis-  therefore indirectly affect returns through the
tent with the maximization  of its utility func-  borrower's increased level of deposits prior to
tion. Covariance of returns from insured loans  spending  the  loan  proceeds,  from  growth
with returns  from  other assets  may  also pro-  arising from the financing, and from accumula-
vide a reason for substitution for other assets.  tion of funds to repay the loan. The loan and its
The more risk averse the bank,  i.e.,  the larger  direct stimulation  of deposits  may also  have
its value of a, the more likely the occurrence  of  further indirect effects.  by increasing the level
such substitution. The redistribution hypothe-  of business activity in the community.
sis would  suggest the substitution of insured  Portfolio theory is helpful in providing some
loans  for  regular  farm  loans  whereas  the  in-  hypotheses  concerning  the  willingness  of
creased supply hypothesis would indicate  sub-  banks to  hold  insured  loans,  but it does  not
stitution for nonfarm assets.  provide a  specific empirical  model  for  testing
This reasoning abstracts  from an important  the hypotheses  of interest to us.  If the objec-
theoretical issue concerning insured loans-the  tive in equation 1 is maximized subject to pro-
insurer's ability to bear the risk of the loan is  duction constraints, asset supply functions can
superior  to that of the cooperating  firm.  Fed-  be derived from the first-order conditions as in
eral  insured  loan programs  derive  this super-  the static theory  of the firm.  These functions
iority from the spreading of risk over the whole  would be reduced-form equations  in that asset
nation  and  the potential  use of  public  subsi-  demand would be a function of exogenous vari-
dies.  However,  GDA operates only in Georgia  ables.  However,  the hypothesis  of interest to
and  has  no  access  to  public  appropriations.  us concerns the relationships between levels of
Though  GDA  undoubtedly  has  more  risk-  GDA loans  and other  assets. Thus,  economic
spreading  ability  than  a  commercial  bank  theory could be used in an indirect  manner to
serving a local area,  its  superior access to  in-  suggest variables to include in a simultaneous
formation  on  farm  real  estate  loans  is  an  econometric model for various assets.
important  component  of its  comparative  ad-  The  specific  model  consists  of  three  equa-
vantage  in  risk bearing.  Akerloff and  Lipton  tions  with  three  endogenous  variables-total
both argue that differential access to informa-  loans  for  an  individual  bank  (TLOAN),  total
tion can affect  agricultural credit institutions,  loans  secured  by  agricultural  assets  for  an
The  operation  of  GDA  requires  specialized  individual  bank (FLOAN), and total  GDA in-
knowledge  about  agriculture  and  security  sured loans for  an individual  bank (GLOAN).
values  of farm real estate which must be  con-  Note that FLOAN is a component of TLOAN,
stantly revised in the dynamic environment  of  and  GLOAN  is  a  component  of FLOAN.  As
modern agriculture.  Insurance  companies  and  cross-sectional data are used in the estimation,
Federal Land Banks have sufficient volume to  each  equation  can  be  considered  a  reduced
justify  employment  of  specialized  personnel,  form of a  supply and  demand  system for the
but many  small  banks and  even  large  banks  particular dependent  variable in the equation.
with a  low volume of agricultural  loans could  The variables included in this model would also
not  justify  such  a  division  of  labor.  The  appear in the supply and demand equations  of
superior  information  of  specialized  personnel  the structural model.
relates to the existence of economies of size in  The  particular  model  specification  for  an
finance.  The  existence  of  such  economies  of  individual bank is
size  from  specialized  personnel  is  a  central  (2)  TLOAN = f1 (FLOAN,  DEP,  URBAN)
'Roe and Nygaard present a theoretical demonstration that improved  information can reduce the variance of profits of agricultural producers.  A similar formula-
tion could be used to derive rigorously the assumption that increased information would reduce variance for agricultural lenders.
26(3)  FLOAN = f(TLOAN,  GLOAN,  SALE,  this logic.  LOAN/DEP is included as a proxy
URBAN)  of risk preferences of bank managers or owners
and a negative relationship  is expected.  SALE
(4)  GLOAN = f3(FLOAN,  SALE,  is included  as a measure of the importance  of
LOAN/DEP)  farming  in  the  market  areas  of  the  bank.  If
banks wish to include farm loans in their loan
where  DEP  =  total  deposits  of  the  bank,  portfolio  but agriculture  is  an  unimportant
URBAN  =  banks  located  in  urban  areas,  business activity in their area, GDA loans may
SALE = gross farm sales in the bank's trading  be  attractive.  The  SALE  coefficient  is
area, and LOAN/DEP = the ratio of total loans  therefore expected to be negative.
to total deposits for the bank.  In summary,  the hypothesis  that the GDA
Our  primary  concern  is  the  coefficient  on  program  increases  agricultural  credit  in
GLOAN  in  equation  3.  If this  coefficient  is  Georgia  is  tested.  Other hypotheses  concern-
greater  than one,  the hypothesis  of increased  ing economic relationships  in rural banking in-
agricultural  credit  is  supported;  if  it  is  less  clude:  (1) agricultural loans reflect economies
than or equal to zero, the alternative hypothe-  of  size  in  farming,  (2)  the  banking  sector
sis  is  supported;  an  intermediate  value  sug-  exhibits economies  of size in loans,  (3) season-
gests some redistribution and some increase in  ality associated with agriculture decreases  the
supply.
4 A  positive  coefficient  on  FLOAN  is  proportion of loans to deposits for farm banks,
expected  in equation  2  because  of likely port-  and  (4)  the  covariance  relationship  between
folio  effects  arising  from  the  covariance  farm loans and other loans allows total loans to
relationships between farm and other loans. If  be higher for banks that include farm loans in
the returns on FLOAN  are less than perfectly  their  loan portfolio.  The results  of the  econo-
correlated  with  other  loans,  increasing  metric analysis provide some evidence on these
FLOAN  will reduce  the risk  of  TLOAN  and  hypotheses.
therefore  allow  substitution  of  TLOAN  for
other less risky assets. DEP is expected  to be  METHODS  AND  PROCEDURES
positively related to TLOAN because it is the
major  source  of  loanable  funds  for  banks  Data to estimate the econometric model were
(Barry);  a  nonlinear  specification  of  DEP  drawn from several sources. Call data from the
would be appropriate because of the previously  Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for June 1975
discussed economies of size in banking. The in-  were used for TLOAN, DEP, and FLOAN. We
clusion  of  URBAN  in equation  2  reflects the  recognized  that  these  variables  would  be
empirical  fact  that  farm  banks  can  loan  a  subject to considerable seasonal variation. The
smaller  proportion  of  their  deposits  because  quarter  ending in June  would be  expected  to
their  deposits  are  more  variable  throughout  reflect the highest seasonal level of FLOAN as
the year (Barry, Hopkins, and Baker). SALE in  harvest of major crops is completed in the sub-
equation  3  reflects the demand for farm loans  sequent  quarter.  Consequently,  the  data  in
as related to agricultural activity in the bank's  June would represent the highest agricultural
trading  area,  and  a  positive  coefficient  is  loan activity.  Data on GLOAN were obtained
anticipated.  The existence of economies of size  from  GDA  for  the  same  period.  For  the  re-
in agriculture arising from more efficient use of  mainder  of the variables  secondary  data were
machinery  and  equipment  (Krause  and  Kyle;  used.  As these variables  reflected  characteris-
Musser  and  Marable)  would  suggest  a  non-  tics  of  the  market  area  of  the  bank,  no
linear  relationship  between  SALE  and  secondary data corresponded to the exact theo-
FLOAN.  TLOAN would be expected to have a  retical  specifications.  Therefore,  we  assumed
positive coefficient  in equation  3  in reflection  that the county in which the bank was located
of the effect of total portfolio size on amount of  represented  the  market  area  of  the  bank
farm loans. A negative coefficient on URBAN  (Boehlje,  Harris,  and  Hoskins).  The  large
in equation 3 would reflect greater demand for  number  of  banks  in  Georgia  increased  the
nonagricultural loans in urban areas.  plausibility of this assumption;  the few banks
Economic  theory  is  not  very  helpful  in  with statewide activity were deleted from the
specifying equation  4 because  of the nonmarket  analysis.  Two  dummy  variables  were  con-
allocation of GLOAN arising from the limited  structed to represent URBAN. URBAN  1 had
size of the GDA program.  FLOAN is included  a value of one for banks located in a county in a
to reflect the impact of the volume  of agricul-  Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area with a
tural credit on possible awareness  of GDA and  city of population at least 15,000 and a value of
existence of customers with needs for the pro-  zero otherwise.  URBAN  2 had a value  of one
gram;  a  positive coefficient  would  conform  to  for banks in a county in a Standard Metropoli-
40ne referee suggested  that insured loans other  than GDA loans may  be a component of FLOAN.  This point is valid  but unfortunately  it was not possible to include such data in the model. A more complete analysis of insured loans would have to include data on these other loans. In the current analysis, it is not possible to
examine the issue of substitution of GLOAN for other insured loans and/or this joint interaction on FLOAN.  However, this weakness  does not mean that the overall
analysis  of the relationship between GLOAN and FLOAN is necessarily  biased.
27tan Statistical Area which did not have a city  ficients.  All coefficients  in  the final specifica-
of at least 15,000  or in a county with a city of  tion except  for  DEPURBAN1  are  significant
at least 15,000 and outside a Standard Metro-  at least at the  10  percent  level  and have  the
politan  Statistical  Area,  and  a  value  of  zero  expected sign.
otherwise  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  The coefficients  in the model  are consistent
1974,  1975).  SALE  was  gross  farm sales  per  with  most of  the  hypotheses  used  to specify
county in 1974 (U.S. Department of Commerce  the model. Most important,  the coefficient  for
1976).  GLOAN  in  equation 6  is  statistically  signifi-
The model in equations  2,  3,  and 4 was esti-  cantly different from zero and positive. There-
mated  with  two-stage  least  squares.  Sample  fore, the analysis supports the hypothesis that
size was  440.  The equations  were  specified  in  GDA  increases  the  aggregate  supply of  agri-
linear form. Both a linear and a quadratic form  cultural  credit.  The  magnitude  of  the  coef-
of DEP were included to allow for economies of  ficient  suggests that GLOAN  has a  portfolio
size in loan departments.  SALE was also speci-  effect  and/or indirect  effect  on FLOAN-each
fied in linear and quadratic forms to allow for  $1.00  increase  in GLOAN  increases  FLOAN
economies of size in use of capital by farmers.  $2.85.  However,  this  relationship  cannot  be
Finally,  both  URBAN  1 and URBAN  2  were  supported  statistically.  The t-statistic  for the
multiplied  by  DEP  and  included  in  some  hypothesis that the GLOAN coefficient is less
specifications of the model.  than one is  1.214,  which cannot be rejected at
standard levels  of significance.  Consequently,
RESULTS  GDA  does  increase  the  aggregate  supply  of
agricultural  credit  but  some  substitution  for
The  final  results  of  the  estimation  follow,  other agricultural loans may occur.
with  asymptotic  Student  t-ratos  in  paren-  The  economies  of  size  hypotheses  are  also
~~~theses,~~.  ~supported.  The  positive  signs  on  DEP  and
(5)  TLOAN = 457.86 + 0.99FLOAN +  DEP2 in equation  5 imply that loans increase
(1.23)  (2.81)  at proportionately greater rates than deposits;
this result is consistent  with the existence  of
.50DEP + 0.00000019DEP2 +  economies of size in banking. The positive sign
(11.0)  (46.98)  on SALE  and the negative  sign on  SALE2 in
equation 6 indicate that loans increase at a de-
0.055DEPURBAN1  +  creasing rate as  sales  in the county  increase.
(1.20)  This relationship reflects several dimensions of
economies  of  size  in  the  agricultural  sector.
0.12DEPURBAN2  Economies of  size in the marketing and farm
(2.97)  supply subsectors could account for decreasing
farm capital requirements per unit of sales.  In
(6)  FLOAN = 246.49 + .00029TLOAN +  addition, economies  of size in farm firms could
(1.64)  (3.22)  contribute  to  decreasing  capital  requirements
per  unit  of  sales  if larger  sales  reflect  larger
2.85GLOAN + 0.092SALE - farm units.
(1.87)  (5.02)  The  model  also  provides  support  for  the
hypothesized relationships between various as-
0.00000086SALE2 - sets. Positive signs on TLOAN in equation  6,
(-1.95)  FLOAN  in equation  7, and DEPURBAN1  and
DEPURBAN2 in equation  5 and the negative
371.49DEPURBAN1  sign on DEPURBAN1  in equation  6  were  all
(1.83)  anticipated.  The larger  magnitude of the  coef-
ficient for DEPURBAN1 than for DEPURBAN2
(7)  GLOAN = 122.66 +0.047FLOAN  - in  equation  5  is  consistent  with  the  greater
(3.42)  (4.99)  stability  of  deposits  in  larger  urban  areas
arising  from  greater  diversification  of  in-
177.68LOAN/DEP - dustry. The positive coefficient  on FLOAN  in
(-3.15)  equation  5  supports  the proposition that  the
correlation between returns on farm and other
0.00000006SALE2 loans is sufficiently small that diversified port-
(-2.78)  folios have reduced variance which encourages
substitution  of  loans  for  other  assets.  The
particular  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  sug-
DEPURBAN2  in  equation  6  and  SALE  in  gests that farm loans are substituted for non-
equation 7 were  deleted  in the final specifica-  loan assets with nonfarm loans being constant.
tion because of statistically  insignificant  coef-  As with the coefficient in GLOAN  in equation
286, this relationship cannot be supported statis-  vide tentative support for the proposition that
tically-the hypothesis  that the coefficient  of  the  current guaranteed  federal  loan  program
FLOAN is less than one cannot be rejected.  increases  the  supply  of  agricultural  credit.
As noted heretofore,  equation 7 has the least  However,  differences  in  operating  practices
support from economic theory. The coefficients  and  in  eligiblity  for  loan  insurance  between
have the anticipated  signs; however,  more the-  GDA  and the FmHA  require  estimation of a
oretical  and empirical research  is necessary to  similar  model  for  federally  insured  loans  to
verify this equation.  verify  this  implication,  particularly  because
FmHA loans were not implicitly considered  in
our research.
CONCLUSIONS  Several  weaknesses  of our analysis  suggest
directions for future research in this area. Most
Our  econometric  model  of  Georgia  banks  important,  more  theoretical  development  of
supports  the view that insured GDA loans  in-  the model  should be considered;  finance litera-
crease  the aggregate  supply  of  credit  to  the  ture  on the banking sector  may be  helpful  in
agricultural sector from commercial banks, but  this  regard.  Disaggregating  the  equation  for
may also result in some redistribution of credit  TLOANS into more specific categories and in-
within  the  agricultural  sector.  This  finding  cluding more equations would also be useful in
does  imply  that  a  national  program  such  as  analyzing  the  tradeoffs  among  alternative
that provided  by  GDA  would  be  effective  in  bank assets. Finally, collection of a time series
increasing  the  participation  of  banks  in  the  of cross-sectional data would  allow estimation
agricultural credit sector. The results also pro-  of the model in structural form.
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